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HUMAN RIGHTS HARMS: CHALLENGES OF AND FOR LAW 1
Sara L. Seck *
This paper will consider whether the polycentric governance approach of the 2011
United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights has the potential to
achieve the goal of transnational corporate compliance with human rights
responsibilities including, importantly, the goal of access to remedy and justice for those
who have been harmed. The paper was initially written as a contribution to a conference
at the University of Windsor entitled Justice Beyond the State: Transnationalism and
Law. First, the paper examines understandings of “citizenship” and “non-citizenship” in
relation to transnational corporate [TNC] accountability in the human rights context.
Two distinct perspectives are explored: first, TNC citizenship and non-citizenship and the
rights and responsibilities that flow from these; and second, citizenship and noncitizenship of victims of human rights violations in relation to rights of access to remedy.
Together, these insights inform an understanding of the role that transnational law and
legal pluralism beyond the state could serve in facilitating remedy for human rights
violations. Specifically, the paper will conclude with reflections on what might be
required for implementation of the UN Guiding Principles to achieve the goal of
transnational corporate compliance and access to remedy for victims of rights violations.
Le présent document examinera si l’approche polycentrique en matière de gouvernance
adoptée par les Principes directeurs relatifs aux entreprises et aux droits de l’homme,
publiés par les Nations Unies en 2011, peut permettre de réaliser l’objectif de la
conformité transnationale des entreprises aux responsabilités en matière de droits de la
personne, notamment et surtout l’objectif de l’accès aux recours et à la justice pour les
parties lésées. Au départ, le document avait été rédigé à titre de contribution à une
conférence à l’Université de Windsor intitulée Justice Beyond the State:
Transnationalism and Law. Le document se penche tout d’abord sur la compréhension
des termes « citoyenneté » et « non-citoyenneté » en ce qui concerne la responsabilité
transnationale des entreprises dans le contexte des droits de la personne. Deux
perspectives distinctes sont étudiées : premièrement, la citoyenneté et la non-citoyenneté
transnationales des entreprises et les droits et responsabilités qui en découlent;
deuxièmement, la citoyenneté et la non-citoyenneté des victimes de violations des droits
de la personne par rapport aux droits d’accès aux recours. Ensemble, ces perspectives
éclairent une compréhension du rôle que le droit transnational et le pluralisme juridique
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au-delà de l’État pourraient jouer pour faciliter les recours en cas de violation des droits
de la personne. En particulier, le document présentera en conclusion des réflexions sur
ce qui pourrait être requis pour mettre en œuvre les Principes directeurs des Nations
Unies de manière à réaliser l’objectif de la conformité transnationale des entreprises et
de l’accès aux recours pour les personnes dont les droits ont été violés.

I. INTRODUCTION
The quest for access to remedy for alleged violations of human rights associated with transnational
corporate conduct has received much attention due to recent developments at the United Nations Human
Rights Council [UN HRC] under the 2005-2011 mandate of the Special Representative on Business and
Human Rights. 2 Following extensive multi-stakeholder and regional consultations in which
transnational corporations [TNCs] and their lawyers, 3 among others, played a critical role, the UN HRC
endorsed the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework [Guiding Principles] in June 2011. 4 The Guiding Principles
are comprised of three “differentiated but complementary responsibilities”: 5 (1) the state duty to protect
against human rights abuses by third parties, including business enterprises, through appropriate
policies, regulation and adjudication; (2) the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, according
to which business enterprises should act with due diligence to avoid infringing on the rights of others
and to address adverse impacts with which they are involved; and (3) the need for greater access to
remedy for victims of business-related abuse, both judicial and non-judicial. While the state duty to
protect is firmly rooted in existing international human rights law, the corporate responsibility to respect
is not, rather arising (at least in part) pragmatically, from the need for businesses to both seek and retain
a “social license to operate”, 6 irrespective of whether a host state is in compliance with its own duty to
protect human rights. Conceptualized as a polycentric governance framework, 7 the Guiding Principles
highlight the importance of both judicial and non-judicial remedy, including operational-level grievance
mechanisms, as tools for closing the governance gaps created by globalization.
Yet, the extent to which state-based judicial mechanisms will in fact be enabled to provide
meaningful and effective transnational remedy is inhibited by perceptions of illicit extraterritoriality (the
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“e-word”) 8 built into multiple legal doctrines designed – intentionally or not – to shield transnational
corporate actors from legal accountability. These doctrines include those arising out of common
understandings of sovereignty and raised in relation to the exercise of home state jurisdiction – whether
prescriptive, adjudicative or enforcement – as well as those arising out of common understandings of
corporate legal personality and raised in relation to the application of legal liability to transnational or
multinational enterprises – whether in domestic or “foreign” courts. The challenges and misconceptions
associated with the doctrines that inhibit transnational legal remedy have created pressure to develop and
enhance the effectiveness of both state-based and non-state-based non-judicial remedy, including
company-level grievance and remedy mechanisms. This dynamic is evident in the Guiding Principles.
However, one unanswered question is how to reconcile the increasing prevalence of transnational nonjudicial mechanisms with the legal systems of host states, and further, with the right of those whose
human rights have been violated to seek both remedy and accountability.
This paper will consider whether the polycentric governance approach of the Guiding Principles has
the potential to achieve the goal of transnational corporate compliance with human rights responsibilities
including, importantly, the goal of access to remedy for those who have been harmed. Before delving
into an analysis of the remedy provisions under the Guiding Principles, however, the paper will first
examine understandings of “citizenship” and “non-citizenship” in relation to transnational corporate
accountability in the human rights context. 9 Two distinct perspectives will be explored: first, TNC
citizenship and non-citizenship and the rights and responsibilities that flow from these; and second,
citizenship and non-citizenship of victims of human rights violations in relation to rights of access to
remedy. Together, these insights will inform an understanding of the role that transnational law and
legal pluralism beyond the state could serve in facilitating remedy for human rights violations.
Specifically, the paper will conclude with reflections on whether implementation of the Guiding
Principles could achieve the goal of transnational corporate compliance and access to remedy for
victims of rights violations.
II. CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP AND NON-CITIZENSHIP, STATE DUTIES
It is true that increasingly policy documents, advocacy groups and scholarly literature speak of the
importance of corporations taking seriously their responsibility as “citizens”. 10 Indeed, the emergence of
the idea of corporate social responsibility [CSR] is indicative of the view that the interests of society and
businesses merge, whether voluntarily undertaken by businesses that embrace enlightened
interpretations of shareholder value, or due to the increasing prevalence of legal “drivers” of CSR. 11 In
law, however, the meaning of corporate citizenship is less obvious, particularly if a transnational
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perspective is embraced.
It is important to first understand what a corporation – transnational corporation [TNC], multinational
enterprise [MNE] – is. 12 Understandings of corporate legal personality depend in part on whether the
conceptualization endorsed is that of separate individual entities incorporated in multiple states (entity
theory) or that of a single TNC or MNE operating across borders (enterprise theory). 13 While legally
corporate entity theory generally prevails, social understandings of large corporate enterprises are based
upon the enterprise as a whole. 14 Thus we speak of “Nike” or “Starbucks” rather than unpacking and
distinguishing the numerous individual entities that contribute to the corporate enterprise as a whole,
whether as legally affiliated companies or contractors. Moreover, corporations are ultimately a collective
of individuals who participate in the enterprise in many different capacities, including as directors,
officers, employees or agents. 15
At first glance, understanding the meaning of corporate citizenship appears inextricably linked to
understandings of nationality. Yet corporate nationality is a challenging concept given the mainstream
view under international law that states are free to determine the criteria for corporate nationality within
their own laws. 16 While state practice with regard to corporate nationality diverges, it is common for
nationality to be accorded on the basis of jurisdiction of incorporation in common law countries, while
in civil law nationality is often conferred on the basis of siège sociale - where the business or
management is carried out. As corporations frequently incorporate in one jurisdiction for tax or other
purposes but undertake business or management in another jurisdiction, it is not uncommon for a
corporation to have more than one nationality. Moreover, state regulatory practices diverge in different
contexts, applying laws on the basis of incorporation in one context, then implicitly adopting a seat of
management test when applying law on the basis of a control test that references owners, managers or
operators. 17 Beyond this, each individual who contributes to the collective corporate enterprise has a
nationality, if not more than one. Unpacking a single legal test for corporate nationality – and thus
arguably corporate citizenship – appears not to be a simple task.
Where the conduct being regulated is undertaken by a TNC or MNE, corporate nationality becomes
even more complex. While a state may apply its law directly to a corporate national with a branch or
office in another state, it may not as a rule (under doctrines of international law) apply its law directly to
a foreign affiliate set up as a separate legal entity under the laws of the host state. Complexity increases
given the prevalence of international joint ventures with several parent company shareholders of
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See Jennifer A Zerk, Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
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See e.g. discussion of Gap Inc in Larry Catá Backer, “Multinational Corporations As Objects and Sources Of
Transnational Regulation” (2007-2008) 14 ILSA J Int’l & Comp L 499 at 509-521. [Cata Backer, “Gap”] However, in
some jurisdictions such as India, the idea of multinational corporate enterprise liability is evident. See Upendra Baxi,
“Mass Torts, Multinational Enterprise Liability, and Private International Law” (1999) 276 Rec des Cours 297, at 399401 [“Mass Torts”].
Sara L Seck, “Collective Responsibility and Transnational Corporate Conduct”, in Richard Vernon & Tracy Isaacs, eds.,
Accountability for Collective Wrongdoing (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 140, at 142-149.
This material is drawn from Sara L Seck, “Home State Responsibility and Local Communities: The Case of Global
Mining” (2008) 11 Yale Human Rts & Dev LJ 177 at 187-189. See also generally, Jennifer Zerk, supra note 13 at 146151.
Seck, ibid; Zerk, ibid.
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different nationalities investing in a company incorporated in the host state. 18 And complexity increases
further if a distinction is drawn between “investment company shareholders” and “operational parent
company shareholders”. 19 Of course the corporate form is but one business structure of the global
economic order. Moreover, the line between “state” and “corporation” is not always an easy one to draw
when account is given to the important role played by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the global
economy, and the history of trading companies in the colonization process is remembered. 20 Crucially,
though, even where “home” states could apply laws to prevent and remedy human rights harms in
foreign host states (by imposing a course of conduct on effectively controlled subsidiaries through the
parent company, or influencing behaviour through minority shareholdings), they generally choose not
to, citing fear of infringing the sovereignty of the host state or competitive disadvantage. 21 This reality
informed the ultimate lack of clarity surrounding the jurisdictional scope of the state duty to protect
under the Guiding Principles, including the hotly debated content of Principle 2, which culminated in
the following compromise:
States should set out clearly the expectation that all business enterprises domiciled in
their territory and/or jurisdiction respect human rights throughout their operations. 22
The choice to focus on the “domicile” of “business enterprises” rather than the “nationality” of
“corporations” in this Principle appears designed to overcome the legal limitations of separate legal
personality of corporate entities. This is to be contrasted with the language of Principle 1, understood by
many as focused exclusively on the duty of the host state:
States must protect against human rights abuse within their territory and/or jurisdiction by
third parties, including business enterprises. This requires taking appropriate steps to
prevent, investigate, punish and redress such abuse through effective policies, legislation,
regulations and adjudication. 23
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paper prepared for June 2013 Conference of the International Law Association’s Committee on Non-State Actors,
Vancouver, BC (on file with author; forthcoming as chapter in edited book, Brill) .
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companies and colonization, see Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 67-69.
See for e.g. discussion of the Canadian state’s engagement with global mining in Sara L Seck, “Canadian Mining
Internationally and the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights” (2011) 49 Can YB Int’l Law 51 [Seck,
“Canadian Mining”]. But see Sara L Seck “Unilateral Home State Regulation: Imperialism or Tool for Subaltern
Resistance?” (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall LJ 565 (discussing the history leading to the current consensus on home state antibribery regulation) [Seck, “Unilateral Home”]. Audrey Macklin & Penelope Simons, The Governance Gap: Extractive
Industries, Human Rights and Home State Advantage (London: Routledge: 2013)
Guiding Principles, supra note 4 at Principle 2. See Seck, “Canadian Mining” supra note 21 at 107-109 (describing
submissions made in relation to Principle 2).
Guiding Principles, supra note 4 at Principle 1; Seck, “Canadian Mining” supra note 21 at 111 (noting that if Principle 1
is read together with Principle 25, a more expansive interpretation of the jurisdictional scope of Principle 1 emerges).
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A key question here is how to understand “jurisdiction” – a question that will remain unanswered for
now. For the purpose of this paper, however, the crucial point is that the complexity surrounding
corporate nationality and home state jurisdiction facilitates a situation in which business enterprises may
benefit from “home” state support for operations abroad (including from export credit agencies, trade
missions abroad, development agency support of CSR initiatives, tax rules, etc). 24 Yet at the same time,
the same business enterprises may argue in transnational corporate accountability litigation brought in
home state courts by foreign plaintiffs that either the litigation should be dismissed to a jurisdiction with
a closer connection (that of the local subsidiary or affiliate) under private international law doctrines
(most notably in non-EU common law jurisdictions forum non conveniens [FNC]), 25 or, if FNC is not
argued, that the litigation should be dismissed as disclosing no reasonable cause of action because the
allegations against the subsidiary or those it contracts with cannot legally be conceptualized as the
responsibility of the parent company, not being captured by traditional “veil-piercing” exceptions or
doctrines of vicarious liability. 26 This line of argument is often successful but perhaps increasingly
failing, at least at a preliminary stage, although consideration of the substance of legal claims in home
state courts remains to date quite rare. 27
At the same time, the historic laws of diplomatic protection as applied to foreign investors has over
the years created a situation in which, due to their claimed status as non-citizens of the states in which
they invest, foreign investors have rights under bilateral and regional investment treaties and investorstate contracts that enable then to sue host states for expropriation of investment opportunities when host
states choose to legislate in the public interest to protect human rights and the environment. These host
states fall victim to doctrines or “disciplines” such as national treatment, most favoured nation, and
compensation for expropriation that benefit investors seeking predictability and security. 28 Curiously,
however, in the investment arbitration context the corporate veil is commonly said to be “irrelevant with
respect to the rights of indirect shareholder companies to launch investment claims.” 29 This is because
24
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Seck, “Canadian Mining” supra note 21 at 66-75 (discussing Bill C-300).
Ibid; see also Sara L Seck, “Environmental Harm in Developing Countries Caused by Subsidiaries of Canadian Mining
Corporations: The Interface of Public and Private International Law” (1999) 37 Can YB Int’l Law 139 [Seck,
“Enviromental Harm”]. Many cases can be cited for this, most notoriously the Bhopal case much discussed in the
writings of Upendra Baxi including: Upendra Baxi, Inconvenient Forum and Convenient Catastrophe (Bombay: NM
Tripathi, 1986); Baxi, “Mass Torts”, supra note 14; International Campaign for Justice in Bhopal, online
<http://bhopal.net/>.
See Seck, “Canadian Mining”, supra note 21, at 64-65 for examples, including Piedra v Copper Mesa Mining Corp,
2010 ONSC 2421, aff’d 2011 ONCA 191, 332 DLR (4th) 118.
For a recent unsuccessful attempt to seek early dismissal, see the Hudbay litigation, Choc v Hudbay Minerals Inc, 2013
ONSC, 1414. For examples from other jurisdictions, see Chandler v Cape Plc, [2012] EWCA Civ 525; Milieudefense et
al v Shell et al, HA ZA 09-1580 (2013). But see infra for a brief discussion of the Kiobel litigation under the US Alien
Tort Statute.
On this see Kyla Tienhaara, The Expropriation of Environmental Governance: Protecting Foreign Investors at the
Expense of Public Policy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Gus van Harten, Investment Treaty
Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). However, more recently, some states are resisting
this dynamic, as evidenced by states that have pulled out of ICSID. See Nicolas Boeglin, “ICSID and Latin America:
Criticism, withdrawal and the search for alternatives (3 December 2013), online: Bretton Woods Project
<http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2013/12/icsid-latin-america/>.
Hansen, supra note 19.
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the definition of investment in many investment treaties includes “‘shares’ without qualifying the level
of ownership required.” 30 Accordingly, “many corporate investors have launched claims in relation to
investments that the investor owns through other corporations.” 31
While I have suggested above that “nationality” might perhaps be equated with “citizenship”, this
may not in fact be the best or only approach. As Karen Knop has astutely observed, there is a private
side to citizenship that can be found in private international law or conflict of laws, where there is “the
normality of encountering the foreign”. 32 Knop notes:
“Private international law starts with a different set of assumptions about the interaction
of states. It begins with the idea that there will be individual comings and goings across
borders. The very raison d’être of private international law is that the state will inevitably
contain foreigners of different kinds—not only those who aspire to citizenship, but also
those who are de passage, traders, exiles, expatriates, transmigrants—and this will
necessarily draw states into a relationship with one another. Furthermore, such
individuals may be regulated by the laws of more than one state and thus belong to more
than one state. Private international law is tasked with where and how to work out these
collisions between laws. Hence, phenomena such as globalization and mass migration do
not disturb the private-international-law paradigm; they chiefly intensify what is already
inherent in it. It follows that overlapping identities, different kinds of membership in the
state, lived membership—virtually all of the innovative ways of theorizing identity and
citizenship—correspond to traditional private-international-law techniques and their
interaction with public law.” 33
Knop notes that “domicile”, a common law test for jurisdiction, allows for individual choice, unlike the
“two-way relationship” of nationality, which is “based on the acceptance of common values”. 34 It is
striking, then, that Principle 2 of the Guiding Principles deliberately chose “domicile” over
“nationality”.
A final intriguing complexity arises if attention is given to regulation of transnational corporate
conduct in areas beyond the jurisdiction of any state. 35 For this, the international deep seabed mining
regime under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS] offers food for thought. 36 Here, we
30
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Karen Knop, “Citizenship, Public and Private” (2008) 71 Law & Contemp Probs 309 at 319.
Ibid at 319.
Ibid at 320. See further Knop’s discussion of “commercial domicile” as a “test of an enemy alien”. Ibid at 325-327.
This part is drawn from Anna Dolidze and Sara Seck, “ITLOS Case No. 17 and the Evolving Principles for Corporate
Accountability under International Law”, draft paper prepared for June 2013 Conference of the International Law
Association’s Committee on Non-State Actors, Vancouver, BC (on file with author; forthcoming as chapter in edited
book, Brill).
See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, December 10, 1982, online: UN
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.htm>;Seabed Disputes Chamber of
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Advisory Opinion: Responsibilities and Obligations of States
Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area (Case No. 17), February 1, 2011, online: ITLOS
<http://www.itlos.org/file-admin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_17/adv_op_010211.pdf > [Advisory Opinion]
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are concerned less obviously with the possibility of human rights violations, but rather with pollution of
a global commons in an area of the world where the significance of citizenship rests upon whether a
corporate entity has been sponsored. Exploration and exploitation activities in the deep seabed may be
carried out in association with the International Seabed Authority [ISA] by “State parties or state
enterprises or natural or juridical persons”. 37 For natural and juridical persons to be eligible to carry out
such activities, they must meet two requirements: “First, they must be either nationals of a State Party or
effectively controlled by it or its nationals. Second, they must be ‘sponsored by such States’,” a
requirement that also applies to state enterprises. 38 The rationale for the sponsorship requirement,
according to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea [ITLOS] Advisory Opinion, is to ensure
that entities “that are subjects of domestic legal systems” comply with obligations set out in
[UNCLOS], “a treaty under international law which binds only States Parties thereto.” 39 This is
achieved by the application of ISA Regulations to these entities, and “implementation by the sponsoring
States of their obligations” thus contributing to “the realization of the common interest of all States in
the proper application of the principle of the common heritage of mankind.” 40
The Advisory Opinion is clear that no State party is “obligated to sponsor an entity that holds its
nationality or is controlled by it or by its nationals” as UNCLOS does not consider “links of nationality
and effective control sufficient to obtain the result that the contractor conforms” with the relevant
instruments. 41 Instead, a “specific act emanating from the will of the State or States of nationality and of
effective control” is required: “the decision to sponsor”. 42 Yet for a domestic law entity to apply for a
contract in the Area and to continue as an active contractor in the Area, it must both “secure and
maintain the sponsorship of the State or States of which they are nationals” and secure and maintain the
sponsorship of a State that either “exercises effective control” or has a national that “exercises effective
control” over the entity. 43 This sponsorship requirement is not, however, applied to State parties (despite
at least two assuming that it did), for “as subjects of international law, States Parties engaged in deep
seabed mining under the Convention are directly bound by the obligations set out therein.” 44
The implications of state sponsorship as discussed in the Advisory Opinion rest upon the premise that
these states will regulate to ensure contractors do not harm the deep seabed, and the Advisory Opinion
explores at length the content of potential responsibility and liability for sponsoring states. Of note for
our purposes, however, is that in the opinion of Nauru, one of the states initiating this Advisory Opinion,
the conclusion by the Deep Seabed Tribunal that all sponsoring states must regulate contractors imposed
too harsh a burden on poor states with limited regulatory capacity, undermining the premise of equal
participation by all states fundamental to the regime. Nauru, by contrast, would have preferred a
contractual approach. 45
Nauru’s position arguably heightens the legal personality of corporate contractors under international
37
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Ibid at para 74.
Ibid at para 74, UNCLOS Article 153, paragraph 2(b).
Ibid at para 75.
Ibid at paras 75-76.
Ibid at para 78.
Ibid.
Ibid at para 77.
Ibid at paras 79-80.
See analysis in Dolidze & Seck, supra note 35.
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law, a position in line with the development of the corporate responsibility to respect under the Guiding
Principles as will be discussed below. In terms of developing an understanding of corporate citizenship
and non-citizenship, I would like to suggest that the deep seabed example complements the stories told
above by reinforcing a hidden message: whether and to what extent corporate citizenship and noncitizenship matter depends in part on the regulatory capacity of the state. And regulatory capacity differs
from state to state, from jurisdictional context to context, and from regulatory context to context. Indeed,
this suggestion is supported by literature that suggests we make a mistake when we blindly idolize the
state as the sole source of regulatory power in an interconnected transnational world. As Larry Cata
Backer and others have argued, it may be equally, if not more accurate to view business enterprises as
legal systems of their own accord, that then “shop” around to different jurisdictions for the “commodity”
we know as state law that might best suit their global agendas. 46
What might this mean for the quest for access to remedy in a world of transnational law? Importantly,
if businesses “shop” for law, do they choose jurisdictions that allow them to escape legal liability and
accountability when accused of human rights violations? Or do they seek jurisdictions that provide the
legal certainty necessary to arrange business affairs in advance, irrespective of where legal liability
falls? Might businesses shop for jurisdictions that provide the possibility of soft non-judicial remedy,
perhaps in the form of mediation designed to help prevent problems from festering into liability issues?
Or will businesses decide that, rather than shop for state law and legal institutions, or even state-based
non-judicial mechanisms, they will instead design their own solutions in the form of company-level
grievance or remedy mechanisms? As we shall see below, all possibilities are promoted under the
Guiding Principles.
II. CITIZENSHIP AND RIGHTS OF ACCESS TO REMEDY
Having explored TNC citizenship, the paper will now briefly explore the implications of citizenship
or non-citizenship for victims of human rights violations. As identified above, within the host state, a
key question might be: does (or should) citizenship include a right to legally enforceable remedy against
non-state actors operating within the state? Within the home state, a key question might be: is legally
enforceable remedy against non-state actors within the state something that is or should be available to
state citizens only or non-citizens as well? In practice, such remedy is often hard to achieve. For those
who believe in law, this is a troubling situation.
The Guiding Principles touch upon this problem under Access to Remedy, noting in Principle 25:
“As part of their duty to protect against business-related human rights abuse, States must
take appropriate steps to ensure, through judicial, administrative, legislative or other
appropriate means, that when such abuses occur within their territory and/or jurisdiction
those affected have access to effective remedy.” 47
46

47

Larry Catá Backer, “Governance without Government: An Overview and Application of Interactions Between Law-State
and Governance-Corporate Systems” in Günther Teubner & Joachim Zekoll, eds, Beyond Territoriality: Transnational
Legal Authority in an Age of Globalization (Leiden: Brill Nijoff, 2012) 101 at 129, online: SSRN
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=15-68934> [Cata Backer, “Governance without Government”]
Guiding Principles, supra note 4 at Principle 25.
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And in Principle 26:
“States should take appropriate steps to ensure the effectiveness of domestic judicial
mechanisms when addressing business-related human rights abuses, including
considering ways to reduce legal, practical and other relevant barriers that could lead to a
denial of access to remedy.” 48
Commentary to Principle 26 goes on to note the importance of effectiveness of judicial mechanisms for
access to remedy, with the “ability to address business-related human rights abuses” being dependent
upon “their impartiality, integrity and ability to accord due process.” 49 The Commentary then highlights
that “States should ensure that they do not erect barriers to prevent legitimate cases from being brought
before the courts” – or at least, they should do this “where judicial recourse is an essential part of
accessing remedy or alternative sources of effective remedy are unavailable.” 50 The language here
suggests the clear understanding that judicial remedy is not the only type of remedy in the toolkit, and
clearly not the only one of value, an understanding that is in keeping with the increasing place given to
mediation and alternate dispute resolution in domestic legal systems. Moreover, the types of remedies
envisioned include “apologies, restitution, rehabilitation, financial or non-financial compensation and
punitive sanctions (whether criminal or administrative, such as fines) as well as the prevention of harm
through, for example, injunctions or guarantees of non-repetition.” 51 The remedy toolkit is expansive.
Commentary to Principle 26 notes that States:
should also ensure that the provision of justice is not prevented by corruption of the
judicial process, that courts are independent of economic or political pressures from other
State agents and from business actors, and that the legitimate and peaceful activities of
human rights defenders are not obstructed.
The importance of the first part of this Commentary is evident in the ongoing Chevron/Ecuador
litigation originally brought in US courts in the 1990s and dismissed in 2002 to the courts of Ecuador as
the better forum for resolving the dispute, with Chevron (Texaco at the time) agreeing to satisfy any
judgment. 52 Twelve years later, enforcement of a US$9.5 billion dollar judgment from the courts of
Ecuador has been fought by Chevron as vigorously as possible wherever possible, including an
unsuccessful attempt to get US courts to bar enforcement of the Ecuadorean judgment anywhere in the
48
49
50
51
52

Ibid at Principle 26.
Ibid at Commentary to Principle 26.
Ibid.
Ibid at Commentary to Principle 25.
Aguinda et al v. Texaco, Inc, 303 F 3d 470 (2d Cir 2002). See also Dan Bodansky, Judith Kimerling, Lucinda Low &
Ralph Steinhardt “Remarks: The Chevron-Ecuador Dispute: A Paradigm of Complexity”, (2012) Vol 106 Proceedings of
the American Society of International Law Proceedings(2012) 415; Texaco/Chevron lawsuits summary, online: Business
& Human Rights <http://www.businesshumanrights.org/Categories/Lawlawsuits/Lawsuitsregulatoryaction/LawsuitsSelectedcases/TexacoChevronlawsuitsreEcuador>.
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world. 53 Most recently, a New York court has found that the long-sought judgment was “fraudulently
obtained”. 54 This judgment is now under appeal, while the Supreme Court of Canada has agreed to hear
an appeal as to whether Ontario courts have jurisdiction to enforce the Ecuadorean judgment against
Chevron and wholly-owned subsidiary Chevron Canada. 55
The importance of not obstructing the peaceful activities of human rights defenders also brings to
mind much-discussed litigation arising out of oil exploitation in Nigeria, as well, indeed, as resource
extraction conflicts that arise in many parts of the world. 56 In 2009 a settlement was reached in which
Shell agreed to pay $15.5 million to the families of environmental activists Ken Saro Wiwa and other
residents of the Ogoni region who had been tortured and killed by the Nigerian government. 57 Yet,
subsequent litigation against Shell over similar issues has resulted, after many years of litigation, in a
USSC decision that has severely restricted the jurisdictional scope of the US Alien Tort Statute due to
the presumption against extraterritoriality. 58
A number of additional “[l]egal barriers” are identified in the Commentary to the Guiding Principles,
including the attribution of legal responsibility among members of corporate groups under criminal and
civil laws; a lack of access to home State court despite facing a denial of justice in the host state court;
and barriers faced by certain groups such as indigenous peoples and migrants. 59 Importantly the
Commentary identifies “[p]ractical and procedural barriers” to access to judicial remedy, including the
“costs of bringing claims”; challenges in “securing legal representation”; “inadequate options for
aggregating claims or enabling representative procedures”; and a lack of state “resources, expertise and
support” to investigate and prosecute human rights crimes. 60 Moreover:
Many of these barriers are the result of, or compounded by, the frequent imbalances
between the parties to business-related human rights claims, such as in their financial
53
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Chevron Corporation v Naranjo, 667 F 3d 232 (2d Cir 2012).
Chevron Corporation v Steven Donziger, 11 Civ 0691 (US Dist Ct, Southern District of NY, March 4, 2014) online:
Conflict of Laws <http://conflictoflaws.net/News/2014/03/chevron-decision.pdf>.
See Yaiguaje v Chevron Corporation, 2013 ONCA 758 (CanLII), leave to appeal to the SCC granted, online SCC
<http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/case-dossier/info/sum-som-eng.aspx?cas=35682> .
Seck, “Kiobel”, supra note 8.
Ibid; Complaint, Wiwa et al v Royal Dutch Petroleum Company et al, (Nov 1996), online Centre for Constitutional
Rights: <http://ccrjustice.org/files/11.8.96%20%20Wiwa%20Complaint.pdf>; Centre for Constitutional Rights, “Wiwa
et al, v Royal Dutch Petroleum et al”, online: Centre for Constitutional Rights <http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/currentcases/wiwa-v.-royal-dutch-petroleum>. The allegations were that Shell acted in concert with the Nigerian government.
The settlement was without admission of wrongdoing.
Seck, “Kiobel”, supra note 8; Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum 569 US (2013). See also “Agora: Reflections on Kiobel,
Excerpts from AJIL and AJIL Unbound” (2014) online: ASIL
<http://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/AGORA/201401/AJIL%20Agora-20Reflections%20on%20Kiobel.pdf> ; and
“The Kiobel Case: the Supreme Court Review of Alien Tort Claims Act”, online: Business & Human Rights
<http://www.business-humanrights.org/Documents/SupremeCourtATCAReview>. On human rights defenders more
generally, see Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Margaret Sekaggya, UN
HRC 19 Session, UN Doc A/HRC/19/55 (21 December 2011) at paras 60-87 and paras 124-126; Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya, Extractive Industries and Indigenous Peoples, UN HRC
24th Sess., UN Doc A/HRC/21/41 (1 July, 2013) at paras 19-25.
Guiding Principles, supra note 4 at Commentary to Principle 26
Ibid.
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resources, access to information and expertise. Moreover, whether through active
discrimination or as the unintended consequences of the way judicial mechanisms are
designed and operate, individuals from groups or populations at heightened risk of
vulnerability or marginalization often face additional cultural, social, physical and
financial impediments to accessing, using and benefiting from these mechanisms. ... 61
Clearly, then, the Guiding Principles recognize that many hurdles face plaintiffs who seek judicial
remedy for human rights violations. Indeed, this suggests that before turning to the transnational we
might first look inward to ask whether, in a rich state like Canada, we can truly say that those who seek
legal remedy for local violations of human rights are in a position to access justice. 62 Certainly when it
comes to violations of human rights with an environmental dimension (environmental justice claims),
the answer given by many is a resounding no, which should give those of us who believe in law a
moment’s pause. 63 While national human rights institutions may have the potential to address some host
state justice claims, there is much work to be done. 64
Turning to the transnational, arguably, the residual role given to the “home” state (arising upon a
denial of justice in the host state) is underinclusive – why might the home state not equally be obligated
to provide a forum if that is the forum of choice of the plaintiffs alleging human rights violations? Key
examples of failures of legal remedy abound, from the infamous Chrevron litigation discussed above to
Bhopal and Kiobel. Beyond what is identified in the UNGPs are other fundamental doctrines of private
international law, premised on the inviolability of sovereignty and comity including the Mozambique
doctrine’s fixation with territory, and doctrines that prevent enforcement of foreign state’s penal and tax
laws. 65 Re-conceiving sovereignty (and comity) in relational terms is a big – and as yet far from
complete – task. 66 Yet by not taking on the challenge, the failure to date of transnational legal remedy
has created pressures for remedy in other forms, a subject to which I will now turn.
III. TRANSNATIONAL NON-JUDICIAL RESPONSES
Two notable features highlight the move away from state law in the Guiding Principles whether host
or home, and the move toward a transnational legal pluralist realm: the emergence of the (non-legal)
61
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Ibid.
See recent comments by Supreme Court of Canada Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin, online: Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/saskatoon/canada-s-top-judge-slams-inaccessible-justice-1.1306993> and
Canadian Bar Association Report, Reaching Equal Justice (2013), online: CBA<
http://www.cba.org/cba/equaljustice/secure_pdf/Equal-Justice-Report-eng.pdf>.
See generally David R Boyd, The Right to a Healthy Environment: Revitalizing Canada’s Constitution (Vancouver,
Toronto: University of British Columbia Press, 2012); Danya Nadine Scott, “Situating Sarnia: “Unimagined
Communities” in the New National Energy Debate”, (2013) 25 J Env L P 81.
See for example Meg Brodie, “Pushing the Boundaries: The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in the
Operationalizing of ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework” in Radu Mares, ed, The UN Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights: Foundations and Implementation (Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012) 245.
See Seck, “Environmental Harm”, supra note 25.
See Karen Knop, “Re/Statements: Feminism and State Sovereignty in International Law” (1993) 3 Transnat’l L &
Contemp Probs. 293 and reference to this analysis together with insights from Third World Approaches to International
Law (TWAIL) in Seck, “Unilateral Home”, supra note 21.
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corporate (business) responsibility to respect rights, and the layering of access to remedy mechanisms so
as to include judicial and non-judicial, state-based and non-state-based, and even company-level
grievance and remedy mechanisms.
Thus, according to the Guiding Principles, businesses are understood to be expected to engage in due
diligence in order to both prevent and, in some cases, remedy, human rights harms. The business
(corporate) responsibility to respect rights is presented in foundational Principle 11 as:
“Business enterprises should respect human rights. This means that they should avoid
infringing on the human rights of others and should address adverse human rights
impacts with which they are involved.”
The Commentary describes this responsibility as a “global standard of expected conduct for all business
enterprises wherever they operate” that “exists independently of States’ abilities and/or willingness to
fulfil their own human rights obligations, and does not diminish those obligations. And it exists over and
above compliance with national laws and regulations protecting human rights.” 67 While phrased in
permissive language (should, not shall), it is expansive in going “beyond” host state law, taking away
the legitimizing power of host state irresponsibility for corporate misconduct.
The Commentary provides that to meet the corporate responsibility to respect, businesses must take
“adequate measures” to prevent, mitigate and “where appropriate,” remediate adverse human rights
impacts. Importantly, “[b]usiness enterprises should not undermine States’ abilities to meet their own
human rights obligations, including by actions that might weaken the integrity of judicial processes.” 68 It
remains unclear exactly what actions might fall within this category, although arguably “litigation
strategy” designed to undermine existing transnational human rights remedy mechanisms could be of
such character, an issue raised by the primary author of the Guiding Principles in relation to the
expansive arguments of Shell in Kiobel. 69
The jurisdictional scope of the business responsibility to respect is addressed in Principle 13 in an
expansive way:
The responsibility to respect human rights requires that business enterprises:
(a) Avoid causing or contributing to adverse human right impacts through their own
activities, and address such impacts where they occur;
(b) Seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to
their operations, products or services by their business relationships, even if they
have not contributed to those impacts. 70
According to the Commentary to Principle 13, “business relationships” are “understood to include
67
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Guiding Principles, supra note 4 at Commentary to Principle 11.
Ibid.
See John Ruggie, “Kiobel and Corporate Social Responsibility” (2012): online: Harvard Kennedy School
<http://www.hks.harvard.edu/mrcbg/CSRI/KIOBEL_AND_CORPORATE_SO-CIAL_RESPONSIBILITY%20(3).pdf>
.
Guiding Principles, supra note 4 at Principle 13.
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relationships with business partners, entities in its value chain, and any other non-State or State entity
directly linked to its business operations, products or services.” 71 This again is an expansive
jurisdictional scope of responsibility, extending far beyond understandings of corporate separate legal
entities, and even beyond the more expansive idea of corporate enterprise, into the realm of contractual
relationships and supply chains. Yet, in the public conscience, this is indeed how the popular press
views the responsibility of business enterprises, or at least large ones in a position to exert power either
to undermine or enhance respect for human rights of stakeholders such as workers, including those down
the supply chain. 72 Moreover, public conscience may yet map onto law if, as suggested by Radu Mares,
consideration is given to tort law and the potential for liability for negligence where risks are
foreseeable. 73
In Principle 15, the Guiding Principles elaborate the “policies and processes” that business
enterprises should have in place (as “appropriate to their size and circumstances”) in order to meet their
responsibility to respect:
(a)
(b)
(c)

A policy commitment to meet their responsibility to respect human rights;
A human rights due-diligence process to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for
how they address their impacts on human rights;
Processes to enable the remediation of any adverse human rights impacts they cause
or to which they contribute. 74

The operational principles under the corporate responsibility to respect expand upon the requirements in
Principle 15. Of note under Principle 17, the Commentary states clearly that human rights due diligence
“can be included within broader enterprise risk-management systems, provided that it goes beyond
simply identifying and managing material risks to the company itself, to include risks to rightsholders.” 75 However, as observed by Nicola Jägers, in order for a company to identify risks to rightsholders and be accountable to them in the “courts of public opinion”, if not in law, it is also necessary
for potential rights-holders or NGOs acting on their behalf to access information often held only by the
company. 76
Also striking in the Commentary to Principle 17 is the apparent clear distinction between the conduct
of human rights due diligence and legal liability. According to the Commentary, while “[c]onducting
appropriate human rights due diligence should help business enterprises address the risk of legal claims
71
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Ibid at Commentary to Principle 13.
This understanding was clearly evident in relation to the Bangladesh factory fire of the summer of 2014, and has
similarly been evident in other similar contexts. See analysis of the Gap in Catá Backer, “Gap”, supra note 14. See also
Karin Lukers, “Human Rights in the Supply Chain: Influence and Accountability” in Radu Mares, ed, The UN Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Foundations and Implementation (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012) 151.
Radu Mares, “Why the Core Company Should Act When Affiliates Infringe Human Rights” in Radu Mares, ed, at 192.
A version of this argument is at the heart of the Hudbay litigation, supra note 27.
Guiding Principles, supra note 4 at Principle 15.
Ibid at Commentary to Principle 17.
Nicola Jägers, “Will transnational private regulation close the governance gap?” in Surya Deva & David Bilchitz, eds,
Human Rights Obligations of Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect? (Cambridge University Press,
2013) 295, at 300.
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against them by showing that they took every reasonable step to avoid involvement with an alleged
human rights abuse,” “business enterprises conducting such due diligence should not assume that, by
itself, this will automatically and fully absolve them from liability for causing or contributing to human
rights abuses.” 77 Further, according to Principle 23:
In all contexts, business enterprises should:
(a) Comply with all applicable laws and respect internationally recognized human
rights, wherever they operate;
(b) Seek ways to honour the principles of internationally recognized human rights when
faced with conflicting requirements;
(c)
Treat the risk of causing or contributing to gross human rights abuses as a legal
compliance issue wherever they operate. 78
Importantly, and as noted in Principle 15, the corporate responsibility to respect rights includes a
responsibility to play a role in providing access to remedy to victims of human rights violations in some
circumstances. This is expanded upon in Principle 22, which provides: “Where business enterprises
identify that they have caused or contributed to adverse impacts, they should provide for or cooperate in
their remediation through legitimate processes.” 79 Yet while “[o]perational-level grievance mechanisms
… can be one effective means of enabling remediation” provided “certain core criteria” found in
Principle 31 are met, the situation is different should “crimes” be alleged, in which case “cooperation
with judicial mechanisms” should be the response. 80
In sum, then, the business responsibility to respect rights as elaborated in the Guiding Principles
represents a move into the realm of transnational legal pluralism and away from obsession with host
state law as the sole normative order of relevance. Notably, it is not a move into the land of public
international law, with its claims of direct corporate responsibility under international law for violations
of egregious norms (at least), including through aiding and abetting or complicity with sovereign host
state violators. 81 Rather, the responsibility is framed in non-legal terms arising from societal
expectations, although whether or not legal significance might ultimately attach – or even currently
exists depending on the content of a particular state’s law – remains an open question. 82
The evidence of a transnational legal pluralist shift away from preoccupation with state law is also
evident in terms of remedy as elaborated in Principles 25-31 of the Guiding Principles. As noted earlier,
77
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Guiding Principles, supra note 4 at Commentary to Principle 17.
Guiding Principles, supra note 4 at Principle 23.
Ibid at Principle 22. The Commentary to Principle 22 clarifies that this responsibility does not extend to situations where
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Ibid at Commentary to Principle 22.
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Law, Governance and Regulation” (2012) 22:1 Business Ethics Quarterly 145; Mares, supra note 73. See also decisions
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while foundational Principle 25 and operational Principle 26 expound upon the duty to the state to
provide access to remedy, and the role of judicial mechanisms in this, Principles 27-31 go beyond state
law, highlighting a role for state-based non-judicial grievance mechanisms (Principle 27), non-statebased grievance mechanisms (Principle 28), operational-level grievance mechanisms (Principle 29),
industry, and multi-stakeholder and other collaborative initiatives (Principle 30). 83 “Effectiveness
Criteria” are then outlined in Principle 31: legitimate, accessible, predictable, equitable, transparent,
rights-compatible, a source of continuous learning, and, for operational grievance mechanisms, based on
engagement and dialogue. 84
Without delving further into the details of these, a few key points are in order. First, the detailed
attention given to non-judicial mechanisms in the Guiding Principles suggests both that additional
guidance was felt necessary in this realm, and that these types of mechanisms are increasingly becoming
important in the business and human rights context. Much evidence of this exists,85 whether due to the
development of state-based processes like the National Contact Point for the Organisation of Economic
Cooperation and Development’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 86 or Canada’s Corporate
Social Responsibility Counsellor for the Extractive Industries Operating Internationally; 87 or non-statebased such as the International Finance Corporation’s Compliance Advisor Ombusdperson. 88 Moreover,
many of these processes have been updated to reflect the new expectations of human rights due
diligence incorporated in the 2011 Guiding Principles. 89
With regard to operational-level grievance mechanisms, the Guiding Principles are clear that
engaging affected stakeholders about the design and process would increase commitment to seeing the
83
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Elisa Morgera, Corporate Accountability in International Environmental Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)
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Foreign Investor Accountability Mechanism” (2008) Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 188; Daniel
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See OECD, “OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises”, (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2011) available online” OECD
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46 at 133-138.
See Seck, “Canadian Mining”, supra note 21 at 65 (on the Canadian experience with the CSR counsellor for the
extractive industries). This mechanism is under review.
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For example, the OECD MNE Guidelines and IFC Sustainability Policy were both updated in 2011. IFC, IFC’s
Sustainability Framework, available online: IFC
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mechanism become a success. 90 Furthermore: “[s]ince a business enterprise cannot, with legitimacy,
both be the subject of complaints and unilaterally determine their outcome, these mechanisms should
focus on reaching agreed solutions through dialogue. Where adjudication is needed, this should be
provided by a legitimate, independent third-party mechanism.” 91 Examples of company-level grievance
mechanisms, as well as company funded but independent remedy mechanisms are increasingly
emerging, as shared learning encourages new attempts. 92 Yet, how to reconcile the outcomes of these
non-judicial, non-state, non-law mechanisms with the rule of state law remains contested, highlighted by
controversy over requirements to sign legal waivers to prevent future civil claims as a condition of
accessing non-judicial remedy. 93
Fascinatingly, the Guiding Principles lump together under Principle 28’s discussion of non-statebased, non-judicial mechanisms both those associated with business and industry associations, and
international and regional human rights law mechanisms that might focus on violations of the state duty
to protect. This is a striking positioning. In state-centric international law, human rights mechanisms,
whether international or regional, are a “higher legal order” than the state, and business enterprises,
which as creatures of statute and creations of states should surely rank lower down the chain or
hierarchy. But if we have moved beyond state-centric international law into a realm where non-state
actors such as businesses, civil society NGOs, and indigenous peoples, all as participants in international
legal process, can create their own mechanisms to resolve disputes, either collaboratively or alone, and if
these mechanisms are seen as no different from those created by states for themselves, then this
positioning becomes easier to understand, if not easier to accept by international human rights lawyers.
Whether or not we choose to call these developments law, drawing upon international legal theories
influenced by constructivist strands of international relations, 94 and scholars who speak of transnational
law, 95 or choose not to call them law at all, does not particularly matter from the perspective of victims
who seek access to justice. (If effectiveness criteria are met, including legitimacy, etc, may we not call it
law?) But it does matter when trying to understand the relationship between decisions arising out of
different legal orders that may or may not be in tension with one another. Within one state, it is clear
what the relationship is between an administrative tribunal and the courts, guided by understandings of
90
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the “rule of law.” Within private international law, foreign courts must “talk” to one another when called
upon to recognize and enforce foreign judgments. Yet, it is not clear how these non-state mechanisms,
whether foreign state-based or company-level can “talk” to the courts of home or host states. Will this
reinforce or undermine the rule of law? Will host states that lack capacity be incentivized to develop it?
Or will necessary resources be drawn away? What does this mean for the possibilities of transnational
justice?
Frustration over the challenge of access to remedy under the Guiding Principles has led to calls at the
UN Human Rights Council for the study of a “binding” international corporate accountability treaty. 96
Beyond the Guiding Principles is a further development that must be noted: the rise of people’s
tribunals, designed to “try” corporations in absentia. 97 How are we to understand these except as
expressions of frustration over the inability of law to provide international, domestic or transnational
justice?
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper first reflected on the question of who is a citizen or non-citizen by examining the rights
and obligations of transnational corporate actors, and the problem of governance gaps created by
globalization that make the achievement of accountability for transnational corporate wrongdoing in the
human rights context challenging. The paper then reflected on the meaning of citizenship by asking
whether it should be understood to include rights of access to remedy against transnational non-state
actors within both host and home state courts. Finally, the paper highlighted the extent to which the
Guiding Principles move beyond state-centric international law and into a realm of transnational legal
pluralism, with corporate responsibility understood expansively in scope but not as law, and remedy
understood expansively in form but challenging to achieve as legally binding accountability.
It is too early to say whether the polycentric governance framework of the Guiding Principles will
prove to be an effective way to providing access to remedy for victims of alleged corporate human rights
violations in a transnational context. Having said this, one conclusion can clearly be drawn: if lawyers
continue to advise corporate clients to engage in never-ending procedural maneuvers that sidestep the
substance of the claims being brought forward, 98 then the possibility of transnational justice and
corporate accountability is in fact an illusion, a magic trick. Critically, we could conceptualize legal
rights and legal obligations as crossing borders, rather than inherently limiting them with understandings
of firm territorial borders created by statehood and guarded by sovereignty. Yet while in theory we
could conceptualize both rights and obligations as crossing borders, in practice we do not. Why is this?
One of the reasons may have to do with our unwitting ongoing “performance” of the boundaries of
sovereignty, even by those who attempt to talk persuasively about “extraterritorial” human rights
obligations of states. 99 Notably, in the corporate accountability context, we do not speak of
96
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“extraterritorial” corporations, but rather of transnational corporations or multinational enterprises
engaged in foreign investment.
It is possible that private international law offers potential for moving beyond this limitation, at least
if the “Gaian tradition” is adopted in which, according to Karen Knop, “the status of ‘citizen’…denotes
membership in a community of shared or common law, which may or may not be identical with a
territorial community.” 100 In the realm of public international law we can find a version of this spirit in
the driving force behind the regime governing international deep seabed mining in the Area beyond the
jurisdiction of any state. Designed to treat the deep seabed as the common heritage of humankind, the
deep seabed regime was fundamentally about all states, whether rich or poor, sharing equitably in
resource exploitation of the deep seabed. Yet the ITLOS decision described briefly above appears not to
appreciate that equitable participation may necessitate differential treatment due to the reality that some
states have more capacity to regulate than others. The solution should not have been to require all states
to regulate or to regulate at the same level, but rather to ensure that all sponsoring states – whether due
to the nationality of the contractor or effective control over the contractor – do their fair share.
Ultimately, this paper suggests that if we are concerned that the increasing role played by nonjudicial mechanisms in the business and human rights context may undermine host state rule of law and
make legal remedy in the transnational human rights context increasingly irrelevant, then we must
revisit understandings of sovereignty and territory as well as corporate legal personality that underscore
contemporary interpretations of private international law and corporate liability doctrines. We must
avoid the “e-word” and write the reality of transnational interconnectedness and mutual responsibility
into our legal doctrines. If we fail to do so, what most lawyers understand as law may increasingly
become irrelevant.
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